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ABSTRACT 
 
In our opinion, the performances at group level must be analyzed differently, depending on 
the adopted strategy. Thus, we consider that a major problem of the accounting and cost 
control is their compatibility with the strategy. This is justified by the fact that a certain 
system, that can be an efficient instrument for assessing the performances of a group whose 
strategy is cost dominated, could cause malfunctions in a company that adopts a 
differentiation strategy. Because groups’ management currently faces a specific problem – 
adopting decisions when several objectives are followed simultaneously or the same objective 
common for more branches – we consider that, in such cases, the decisions cannot be based 
on a classic model of optimization of a single objective function. We consider that an 
optimization model with several objective functions, which aims at optimizing the costs for the 
subsidiaries and choosing a satisfactory solution for the company, is necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the thesis of M. Porter (Porter, 1997), a company can achieve a long lasting 
competition advantage based on cost or differentiation. The cost domination strategy has as 
main objective achieving a low cost in comparison with the competition. The differentiation 
domination strategy consists in differentiating the products by something, which is considered 
to be unique for the consumers. As differentiation elements, we can consider the brand 
fidelity, a superior service for the customers, the conception and the specific features of the 
product, the technology etc. Therefore, gaining a competition advantage on the market, which 
is one of the problems that the managers must face in the conditions of a bigger and bigger 
competition, can result either by a superior quality for the customer for the same price, either 
by the same quality for a smaller price. 
By taking over Porter’s idea, some authors, among whom M. Gervais (1995), P. Lorino, L. 
Dubrulle (2002), Ch. Hohmann (2004) sustain that the new approach of management 
accounting must aim to the integration of the production and to the strategy of the company. 
In our opinion, the performances of the activity of a company must be analysed differently, 
depending on the adopted strategy. Thus, we consider that a major problem of the accounting 
and cost control is their compatibility with the strategy. This is because, as Shank, 
J.&Govindarajan, V.(1990) asserted, a certain system, that can be an efficient instrument 
for assessing the performances of a company which strategy is the cost domination, could 
create malfunctions in a company that adopts a differentiation strategy. We also find recent 
  
preoccupations regarding strategic business accounting at Glynn J.J., Murphy M.P., Perrin J., 
Abraham A. (2003), which take into consideration the criticisms at the address of 
management accounting brought about by Robert Kaplan, a well known professor at Harvard 
University, who considered that theory and research are out of touch with practice, and with 
what happens in the business world. Like other researchers attracted to the Japanese 
experience, Kaplan proposes a tighter relationship between theory and practice and offers a 
synthesis of the practices of management economics in Japanese companies, as well as their 
perspectives. (We must take into account that this discrepancy between theory and practice is 
to be found also in the system of management accounting in our country). 
Consequently, there appeared the thesis sustained by the advocates of SCM who take into 
account a closer approach to the strategy. They consider that the role of the accounting system 
in general, and of the costs, in particular, is that of facilitating the formulation and the 
translation into practice of the strategy.  
In this context appears the strategic accounting (Morse W.J., Davis, J.R., Hartgraves, Al. L. 
2000) that sustains the competitive advantage. Thus, one aims to find a market position 
relatively comparable with that of the competitors.   
Strategic Management Accounting-SMA lays the stress on a clear strategy, with a strong 
quality orientation, associated to the marketing function. This is considered a data basis and a 
basis of information analysis, which refers to business and to competition, which allows the 
development of the business strategy (we refer to information about costs, prices, sales 
volume, cash-flow, results). Thus, the companies’ management direction can appreciate the 
competitive position of their activity and can implement strategies for increasing the 
competitiveness. 
In a reference study regarding Strategic Management Accounting (Innes J. 2004), the 
emphasis is placed on Strategic Cost Management SCM, respectively on the analysis of the 
values’ chain which supposes the following of the production process from raw material to 
the finite product offered to the consumers. This imposes a development of the accounting 
information system with direct impact on the efficiency of cost management. 
In this paper, we have analysed the cost domination strategy at the level of a group of 
societies which comprise in their structure two or more subsidiaries (ESC-complete 
subordinated entities) on which the group leader exerts the exclusive right control (for he 
owns at least 50% plus one  share of the total number of shares) or the de facto control 
(situation in which there is no other superior share and thus the group leader maintains his 
position). Using the mathematical methodology, we have carried out a model for 
implementing such a strategy, which could improve the information system of the costs in a 
group. This system must be analysed and assessed depending on its contribution to the 
success of the group. 
Because the management of the societies group currently face a specific problem – adopting 
decisions when several objectives are followed or the same objective, but for more 
subsidiaries– we have considered that, in such cases, the decisions can’t be made relying on a 
classic model of optimization of a single objective function. In these circumstances, we have 
carried out an optimization model with several objective functions, which aims optimizing the 
costs for the subsidiaries and choosing a satisfactory solution for the group. 
 
 
1. A MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE COST DOMINATION STRATEGY 
 
1.1. The elaboration of the general model 
 
As previously specified, the model can be applied for the case of a group and aims 
minimizing the costs for each subsidiary and providing efficient solutions for the 
management. 
The model implies the use of the same technological process for each subsidiary, which 
remains unchanged, no matter the objective, otherwise speaking, the imposed restrictions are 
the same, but the costs are different. 
  
In the linear case, we have to minimize the costs for s subsidiaries: 
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( )niskCki ,1,,1 ==  - are the costs made to achieve a product unit Pi to subsidiary Fk. 
 
The restrictions for the functions Ck(x) that have to be minimized (as known from the linear 
programming models) embrace the following form: 
 
(2) BAX ≤                                                    (or AX=B) 
(3) 0≥X  
 
A – the matrix of the technological coefficients; 
B – the matrix of the available resources. 
Therefore, we have a solve a problem of linear programming with several objective 
(efficiency) functions. 
In this case, the optimum solution for an efficiency function is not optimum for the others as 
well. That’s why we have to look for a solution that realizes the best compromise, better 
known as “efficiency solution” or “efficacious solution”. 
Considering D as the multitude (the domain) of possible solutions for the system (2), 
DX ∈0  is an efficient solution if there is no DX ∈  so that ( ) ( )0XCXC kk ≤ , sk ,1=  
and for at least a k0 we have ( ) ( )0XCXC kk < . 
Otherwise speaking, X0 is efficient solution if there isn’t another solution in D to minimize at 
least a function when the others remain unchanged. 
This concept is used in the game theory as well. 
In order to determine such a solution, several methods can be used. 
Some of these functions begin with finding the solution x* to minimize a synthesis function 
of  the “s” functions that have to be minimized, meaning the function: 
h(C1,C2,C3 ......Cs). 
Such a synthesis function can be defined as follows: 
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Notice:  
In case a), if Ci(X) are maximum functions, then h(C1,C2,C3 ......Cs) = ( ){ }XCi
si ,1
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=
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have to be maximized: { })(minmax
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which is similar with the criterion max(min), min(max) from the games theory. 
In view of this notice, we shall consider, for the case b), that 1=iβ , meaning: 
h(C1,C2,C3 ......Cs) = )(
1
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s
i
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where iλ  represents the weights of the efficiency functions Ci(X), that have to reflect their 
relative importance in the general process of optimization. 
An admissible solution is efficient only if it is an optimum solution for the problem: 
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Considering the previous notice and taking into account the conclusions of S.M. Belenson and 
K.C. Kapur (1983), we shall choose ),1( sii =λ  as a mixed strategy resulted by solving a 
matrix game of two persons with null sum. 
We’ll suppose that the “s” problems of linear programming problems were solved: 
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and the “s” optimum solutions ),1(* siX i =  were obtained. 
We shall construct the matrix: 
M=(Cij); sji ,1, =  
Cij = Ci(Xj) 
also named (in the games theory) the payments matrix. 
We’ll consider a strategic matrix game, with null sum, with maximizing gamer on liner 
minimizing on columns, with a M matrix. 
If ( )sλλλλ ,....,, 21=  and 
         ( )sμμμμ ,....,, 21=  
are the optimum mixed strategies obtained by solving the game for the maximizing gamer and 
respectively minimizing, we shall consider the synthesis function: 
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which have to be minimized. 
Notice: 
The mixed strategy μ  of the minimizing gamer was chosen because there were minimum 
problems. If there were maximum problems, then the mixed strategy λ  of the minimizing 
gamer was chosen. 
We’ll solve the problem of linear programming: 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
≥
=
= ∑
=
0
)()(min
1
X
BAX
XCxf
s
k
kkμ
 
which for we find the optimum solution X*. 
The problem is if X* is an efficient solution. 
According to the definition of a mixed strategy: 
if ( )sμμμμ ,....,, 21=  respects the conditions that X* is efficient solution, then the problem is 
solved. 
  
If the matrix game with the matrix M, previously defined, can be gamed by pure strategies 
(the game has saddle point), id est there is i0, j0 so that: 
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consequently an efficient solution is obtained by solving the problem: 
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1.2. Case study 
 
For a better understanding of the proposed model, we shall present the following case study: 
We have to minimize the costs for two subsidiaries, which for: 
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                          832 4321 =+++ xxxx           4,1,0 =≥ ixi  
Therefore, two problems of linear programming are been solved, by determining the 
minimum of the functions )(1 xC  and )(2 xC . 
By using the simplex algorithm, we determine the optimum solution for the first problem of 
linear programming with the objective function )(1 xC : 
      X1=(4,2,0,0)   
 
and for the second problem of linear programming with the objective function )(2 xC : 
      X2=(0,2,0,4)    
With the optimum solutions of the two problems of linear programming, we construct the 
payments matrix: 
      M=(Cij),  i, j = 1,2 
where        )( jiij xCC = , i, j = 1,2 
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and taking into account the solutions of the two problems is: 
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So, we have to solve a matrix game with null sum and maximizing gamer on lines and 
minimizing on columns, with the matrix M. 
If, for the maximizing gamer, the mixed strategy is: 
      ),( 21 λλλ =  with 1,0 212,1 =+≥ λλλ , 
  
and for the minimizing one the mixed strategy is: 
     ),( 21 μμμ =  with 1,0 212,1 =+≥ μμμ , 
by solving the game we obtain the mixed strategies: 
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We can construct a new problem with the efficiency function: 
       )()()( 2211 XCXCXC μμ +=  
i.e.: 
                   )(
10
7)(
10
3)( 21 XCXCxC +=  
By making the calculations, we obtain: 
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We solve the following problem with the simplex algorithm: 
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                      4,1,0,832 4321 =≥=+++ ixxxxx i  
We obtain the solution: 
                       X =(0,0,2,2)    
which is an efficient solution. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If we consider the efficiency function ( )XC1 , i.e. for minimizing the costs for subsidiary 1F , 
there will be made the products 1P  and 2P , in quantities x 1 = 4 and x 2 = 2, and will not be 
made the products 3P  and 4P ; thus, we obtain the minim cost for subsidiary 1F : 
min ( )XC1  = 6. 
If we consider the efficiency function ( )XC2 , i.e. for minimizing the costs for subsidiary 
2F , there will be made the products 2P and 4P  in quantities x 2 = 2 and 4x = 4 and will not be 
made the products 1P  and 3P ; thus, we obtain the minim cost for subsidiary 2F : 
min ( )XC2  = 4. 
By admitting the solution of “the best compromise”, meaning an efficient solution for the 
group, we take into consideration the solution of the problem which for the efficiency 
function is ( )XC , which implies that the products 3P  and 4P  will be made, in quantities x 3  
= 2 and x 4 = 2 and will not be made the products 1P  and 2P , and the minimum cost for the 
entire group is: 
min 
20
87)( =XC = 4,35. 
We notice that min )(XC  is comprised between min ( )XC2  and min ( )XC1 . 
Relying on these results, it is interesting to point out the decisions that the group can make, 
according to the presented case study: 
  
1. Only the products  1P  and 2P  are made in subsidiary 1F . In this situation, the minimum 
cost is 1C = 6. 
2. Only the products  2P  and  4P  are made in subsidiary 2F . In this situation, the minimum 
cost is 2C = 4. 
3. Only the products  3P  and 4P  are made in subsidiaries 1F  and 2F . In this situation, the 
minimum cost of the group is C = 4,35. 
This is too the proposed solution by applying the model. According to the presented case 
study, let’s see which are the quantities of the products 3P  and 4P  that have to be made.  
For subsidiary 1F  for the product 3P  we have the quantity 2*103  
For subsidiary 2F  for the product 3P  we have the quantity 2*107  
For subsidiary 1F  for the product 4P  we have the quantity 2*103  
For subsidiary 2F  for the product 4P  we have the quantity 2*107  
If the group will produce in these terms, it will post on the whole the smallest costs and will 
succeed to face the competition through the cost domination strategy. 
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